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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gentry appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation 
executing, without reduction, the underlying unified sentence of five years, with 
three years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to felony battery on detention 
staff. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
While incarcerated in the Bannock County jail awaiting disposition of a 
probation violation in a felony injury to jail case, Gentry "became highly agitated," 
threw "objects in his cell, at the cell door and out from under the cell door," 
refused to comply with detention staff's instructions, "kicked a food tray towards 
the [detention] deputies, and then kicked his shoe at them" and, ultimately, 
"swung his left closed fist at [one of the detention deputies] and hit him on the 
upper lip." (PSI, pp.3, 7; Tr., p.78, L.23 - p.79, L.4.) 
The state charged Gentry with felony battery on detention staff. (R., 
pp.49-50.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Gentry pied guilty to 
the battery on detention staff charge and also admitted to having violated his 
probation in the injury to jail case; the state dismissed two unrelated drug 
possession cases; and the parties agreed, inter a/ia, that Gentry would "be 
sentenced to no more than [a period of] Retained Jurisdiction." (R., pp.88-89; 
see also Tr., p.1, L.11 - p.18, L.5.) The district court accepted the plea 
agreement and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. 
(R., pp.90-91; Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.1, p.39, Ls.9-13.) Upon the 
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recommendations of both parties, the Court suspended the sentence and placed 
Gentry on probation for three years, to run consecutively to Gentry's sentence in 
the injury to jail case. (R., pp.91-91-97; Tr., 25, L.16 - p.28, L.18, p.32, L.8 -
p.34, L.19, p.39, Ls.2-16.) Although not a formal condition of Gentry's probation, 
it is clear from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the court placed 
Gentry on probation with the understanding that Gentry would seek an interstate 
compact to Minnesota. (Tr., p.25, 16 - p.28, L.18 - p.32, L.5, p.34, Ls.17-19, 
p.36, L.12 - p.37, L.9, p.42, L.2 - p.46, L.5.) 
On August 16, 2012, less than one month after Gentry was placed on 
probation, Gentry's probation officer submitted a report of violation alleging that 
Gentry had associated with a known felon, failed to provide a urine sample at his 
probation officer's request, changed residence without permission, provided false 
information to a law enforcement officer, failed to report to his supervising officer, 
and absconded supervision. (R., pp.101-04.) On August 28, 2012, Gentry's 
probation officer filed an addendum to the report of violation, alleging Gentry had 
been arrested on a bench warrant and, following his arrest, failed to cooperate 
with police. (R., pp.107-09.) 
At a hearing on November 7, 2012, Gentry admitted to having violated his 
probation by associating with a known felon, failing to provide a urine sample, 
changing residence without permission and failing to report for supervision; the 
state withdrew the remaining allegations. (Tr., p.48, L.17 - p.50, L.15.) After 
finding Gentry in violation of his probation, the district court indicated its 
understanding that the "State [wasJ interested in putting Mr. Gentry back on 
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probation ... and still having him interstate compact out of state." (Tr., p.50, 
Ls.16-20.) In response to the court's inquiry, Gentry acknowledged that 
Minnesota was "no longer an option," but he advised the court he would seek an 
interstate compact to North Carolina to stay with his maternal aunt (Tr., p.50, 
L.20 - p.51, L 12.) The district court continued Gentry on probation with 
following additional terms and conditions: 
1. You will apply through the Interstate Compact to transfer to 
North Carolina to live with your maternal Aunt. The Court 
will waive the application fee for the Interstate Compact 
2. Should you fail to be approved for the Interstate Compact to 
North Carolina, you will need to come back before the Court. 
3. You will remain incarcerated at the Bannock County Jail until 
the Court sends a separate order to release you. 
(R., p.123; also Tr., p.51, L.25 - p.52, L.6.) The court specifically advised 
Gentry, "If the interstate compact fails, then you'll come back in front of me for a 
different disposition, and we'll figure out what to do at that point Do you 
understand that?" (Tr., p.52, Ls.3-6.) Gentry acknowledged he understood. (Tr., 
p. L.7.) 
Approximately one month later, on December 5, 2012, Gentry's probation 
officer submitted an "Order to Show Cause" alleging Gentry had violated the first 
additional condition of his probation. (R., pp.124-26.) Specifically, the probation 
officer alleged he had "received an email from [Gentry's] maternal aunt saying 
that [Gentry] cannot live with her in North Carolina" for a number of reasons, 
including that she was "not in a position to provide support for him." (R., p.125.) 
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At a show cause hearing on January 7, 2013, Gentry's counsel confirmed 
that an interstate compact to North Carolina was "out of question." (Tr., p.54, 
Ls.6-16, p.56, Ls.1-10.) Counsel further advised the court that it was "still 
[Gentry's] desire to not be in the Pocatello area anymore," but that Gentry was "in 
a situation where he's not able to interstate compact to anyplace else with family 
at this point in time." (Tr., p.55, Ls.9-15; see also Tr., p.58, Ls.19-22 ("Your 
Honor, [Gentry] is not necessarily happy with the aspect of staying in Pocatello. 
But unfortunately, he's caught in a situation where there really is not choice in 
front of him.").) Counsel suggested continuing Gentry on "probation locally" - in 
Pocatello - "and then working on transferring his probation elsewhere should he 
be able to put the resources together." (Tr., p.55, Ls.15-19.) Noting the state 
had not been given the opportunity to consider the proposal for local release, the 
district court set the matter over for two weeks. (Tr., p.55, Ls.20-25, p.56, Ls.11-
18, p.57, Ls.15-24.) 
At the continued hearing on January 22, 2013, Gentry's counsel advised 
the court that "Gentry himself worries about his ability to be successful in 
Pocatello." (Tr., p.65, Ls.13-14.) He nevertheless asked the court to grant 
Gentry work search and/or work release to attempt to put in place housing and 
other services that had been offered him by his local church and, ultimately, to 
reinstate him on probation. (Tr., p.65, L.6 - p.68, L.9.) Gentry's probation officer 
opposed the request for local release, noting Gentry "does really well when he's 
confined looking for resources in the community. But once he gets out in the 
community, he doesn't look for those resources any longer" and, ultimately, fails 
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on probation. (Tr., p.68, L.21 - p.69, L.25.) The state agreed with the probation 
officer's assessment and, in light of Gentry's prior failed attempts at community-
based rehabilitation and his inability to secure an interstate compact, 
recommended the court revoke his probation and execute the original sentence. 
(Tr., p.70, L.3 - p.73, L.21.) 
Gentry's counsel argued against the state's recommendation, opining that 
"revoking probation because Mr. Gentry fails to execute and succeed on an 
interstate compact is unfair." (Tr., p.75, Ls.2-5.) The district court interjected 
and, addressing defense counsel, clarified: 
THE COURT: Well, let me stop you right there. Because 
the agreement was the only way - both you and [Gentry] conceded 
the only way he was going to make it is if he left the State of Idaho. 
He could not make it in Idaho. 
THE COURT: So if I revoke probation, it's not because the 
interstate compact failed as much as it is he's already told me he 
can't succeed here in Pocatello. 
(Tr., p.75, Ls.6-14.) After reviewing Gentry's history of failures on probation, and 
after hearing from Gentry - who requested probation (Tr., p.81, L.7 - p.86, L.8) 
but admitted that "if [he] was to choose, Pocatello would be one of the last places 
that [he] would like to reside" (Tr., p.81, Ls.8-11 (comma placement altered for 
ease of readability)) - the district court revoked Gentry's probation, executed his 
underlying sentence, and retained jurisdiction for 365 days (Tr., p.86, Ls.14-16; 
R., pp.141-49). In doing so, the court explained: 
Maybe you've made the changes you're telling me about 
here in open court, but the strongest thing I've heard is what you 
told me last time. And that is you will not succeed in Pocatello. I 
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want you to prove to me you can succeed in a confined 
environment of a rider program, and then we'll talk about probation. 
(Tr., p.96, Ls.20-25.) 
Ultimately, Gentry did not succeed in the confined environment of the rider 
program (see generally APSI (augmentation)), and the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction (6/18/13 Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction (augmentation)). In the 
interim, Gentry timely appealed from the court's order revoking his probation. 
(R., pp.152-54.) 
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ISSUES 
Gentry states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. 
Gentry's probation? 
2. When the district court revoked Mr. Gentry's probation, did it 
abuse its discretion by executing his underlying sentence of 
five years, with three years fixed, without any reduction? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Gentry failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
revoking his probation? 
2. Has Gentry failed to show the district court abused its discretion when, 
upon revoking Gentry's probation, it ordered his underlying sentence 
executed without reduction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Gentry Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking 
His Probation 
A Introduction 
The terms of Gentry's probation required him to "apply [for] and obtain [an] 
Interstate Compact transfer to North Carolina before release from jail." (R., 
p.143; compare with R., p.123.) Based on its finding that Gentry violated this 
condition, the district court revoked Gentry's probation. (R., p.143.) 
On appeal, Gentry "concedes that he acknowledged that he violated the 
term of his probation requiring him to secure an interstate compact." (Appellant's 
brief, p.8 (citing Tr., p.54, Ls.6-16).) He argues, however, that the district court 
lacked authority under I.C.R. 33(e) to revoke his probation because the violation 
- failing to obtain an interstate compact - was not willful. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-
13.) Gentry's argument fails. The district court had authority under a number of 
relevant statutes to revoke Gentry's probation upon finding him in violation 
thereof, regardless of whether the violation was willful. To the extent I.C.R. 33(e) 
conflicts with the statutes that govern a court's authority to revoke probation, the 
statutes - not the procedural rule - prevail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is one within the discretion of the sentencing court." State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 
39, 773 P.2d 655, 656 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing I.C. § 20-222). When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appeJlate court conducts a 
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multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
bounds of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 
1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 
1333 (1989)). 
"The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by 
analogy, court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free 
review." Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464,467 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In 
Revoking Gentry's Probation Upon Finding That He Violated The 
Conditions Thereof, Regardless Of Whether The Violation Was Willful 
The authority of a trial court to revoke probation is governed by several 
statutes. Among them, Idaho Code § 20-222 provides: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the 
court may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of 
probation or suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be 
arrested. Thereupon, the court, after summary hearing may revoke 
the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence 
imposed to be executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought 
before it and may continue or revoke the probation, or may impose 
any sentence which originally might have been imposed at the time 
of conviction. 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant's 
probation when the defendant has violated "any of the conditions of probation." 
I.C. § 20-222 (emphasis added). Nowhere in this statute is there a requirement 
that the violation be "willful." Rather, the only limitation on the court's authority to 
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revoke probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of 
one or more conditions of probation. 
Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad 
authority to revoke probation. In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court's 
"authority to revoke the probation does not even depend upon [aJ violation of any 
of the terms or conditions of the order." Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 
P.2d 794, 798 (1953), quoted in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 
552, 554 (1964). Idaho Code § 19-2602 authorizes a district court to "issue a 
bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant" either where "it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions upon which the defendant 
was placed on probation by the court or any of them have been violated or for 
any other cause satisfactory to the court." (Emphasis added.) "When the 
defendant is brought before the court in such case," Idaho Code § 19-2603 
provides that the court "may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any 
judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally 
pronounced but suspended, the original judgment shall be in full force and effect 
and may be executed according to law." 
Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-
222, Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state 
have statutory authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: "(1) [upon] 
satisfactory proof of a violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] 'any other 
cause satisfactory to court."' State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311,314,766 P.2d 781, 
784 (1988) (citing I.C. §§ 19-2602 and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 
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Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899, 900 (Ct. App. 1991 ); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho 
at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; 
State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986). It is true that 
Idaho's appellate courts have held that a trial court must consider alternatives to 
imprisonment before revoking a defendant's probation based on a violation that 
"not willful, or was beyond the probationer's control." State v. Sanchez, 149 
Idaho 102, 106, 233 P.3d 33, 37 (2009). However, nothing in the relevant 
statutes (or in the case law to this point) actually prevents a trial court from 
revoking probation where the violation or other "cause satisfactory to the court" 
was not willful. 
In this case, the court required as a special condition of Gentry's probation 
that he apply for and obtain an interstate compact to North Carolina. (R., pp.123, 
143.) Gentry concedes he admitted to having violated that condition of his 
probation, albeit through no fault of his own. (Appellant's brief, p.8 (citing Tr., 
p.54, Ls.6-16); see also Tr., p.56, Ls.1-10, p.65, Ls.11-13, p.81, Ls.14-17.) In 
light of Gentry's admission to having violated an express condition of his 
probation, there can be no question that the district court had authority under I.C. 
§§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke Gentry's probation and order 
executed his previously imposed underlying sentence. 
Without even mentioning the statutes that govern a trial court's authority 
to revoke probation, Gentry argues on appeal that the district court lacked 
authority to revoke his probation because Rule 33(e) of the Idaho Criminal Rules 
c$tates that a "court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the 
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defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant 
willfully violated a condition of probation." (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10, 13.) The 
state acknowledges that the plain language of this rule purports to divest trial 
courts of authority to revoke probation unless the defendant admits, or the court 
finds, that the defendant "willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(e). 
The requirement of the rule that there be a willful probation violation before a 
court may revoke probation is of no effect, however, because it directly conflicts 
with the broad authority to revoke probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 
and 20-222, and because a court's authority to revoke probation is a matter of 
substantive, not procedural, law. 
"When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a 
way that results in a conflict." State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 
P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 
P.3d 912, 916 (2008)). In this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably 
interpret I.C.R. 33(e) in a way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 
and 20-222. Pursuant to the rule, a trial court "shall not revoke probation unless 
... the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." !.C.R. 33(e). The 
statutes, on the other hand, give the court broad authority to revoke probation 
upon proof of a violation of "any" of the probation conditions or "for any other 
cause satisfactory to the court." I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222. 
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, "this Court 
must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance." 
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Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 
Idaho 539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 
228 P.3d at 391. "Substantive law issues are the province of the legislature, 
while matters of rulemaking and procedure are generally the province of the 
judiciary." Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 
Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 
774 (1975)). Thus, if the conflict between a statute and a criminal rule relates to 
matters of procedure, the criminal rule will prevail. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 
188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 
(1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390. "Conversely, in matters of 
substantive law, the statute applies." Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 
390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893). 
In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or, 
instead, to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the 
following general guidelines: 
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure 
pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by 
which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. 
Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 
674, 676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-
93; Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710,228 
P.3d at 391. 
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Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court 
determined that any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) - which requires a charging 
document to allege the "essential facts constituting the offense charged" - and 
I.C. § 19-1430 - which abolished the distinction between accessories and 
principals such that "no other facts need be alleged in any indictment against 
such an accessory than are required in an indictment against his principal" - was 
a matter of substantive law. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. 
Specifically, the Court explained: 
The Legislature's definition of principal and abolishment of the 
distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain to 
mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is creating, 
defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. § 19-1430 is 
substantive and does not overlap with this Court's power to create 
procedural rules. Therefore, even if I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) 
were in conflict, the statute would prevail. 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. 
Similarly, in Beam, supra, the Court held that a statute requiring a 
defendant in a death penalty case to file a challenge to his or sentence within 42 
days prevailed over I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at 
any time. Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893. The Court reasoned that, 
given the unique nature of the death penalty, the statute "creates, defines, and 
regulates a primary rights" and, as such, was a matter of substantive law. kl 
Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and .Beam, the statutes granting trial 
courts authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the 
conditions of probation or "for any other cause satisfactory to the court" are 
substantive in nature. It is well settled that probation, itself, "is not a matter of 
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right; it may be granted the defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the 
trial court within the ambit of authority conferred by the legislature." Franklin, 87 
Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554. Because a trial court's power to place a 
defendant on probation only exists as a function of the legislature's power to 
enact substantive law, it follows that a court's authority to revoke probation is 
likewise a matter exclusively within the province of the legislature. See id. at 
300-01, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted) ("The legislatures of the several 
states have the exclusive and inherent power to define, prohibit and punish any 
act as a crime within the limits of the federal and respective state constitutions."). 
Indeed, a review of Idaho Code § 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 shows they do 
not merely prescribe the mechanical procedure a court must follow in revoking 
probation. Instead, they actually define and regulate the circumstances under 
which a legislatively authorized grant of probation may be revoked. 
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of 
substantive law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority 
must '"be given due deference and respect."' Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 
P.3d at 916 (quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 
614, 623 (1995)). Accordingly, to the extent I.C.R. 33(e) purports to divest trial 
courts of the authority granted to them by the legislature to revoke probation 
upon proof of a violation of any probation condition or for "any other cause 
satisfactory to the court," the rule is of no effect. In light of Gentry's admission to 
having violated an express condition of his probation, the district court had 
authority under I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke Gentry's 
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probation, regardless of whether the violation was willful. Gentry's argument to 
the contrary is without merit and fails to establish an abuse of discretion. 
11. 
Gentry Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Court's Decision 
To Order Gentry's Sentence Executed Without Reduction 
A. Introduction 
Gentry argues that, "when the district court revoked his probation, it 
abused its discretion by executing his underlying sentence of five years, with 
three years fixed, without any reduction." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) The record, 
however, supports the court's decision to order Gentry's sentence executed 
without reduction. Gentry has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether to reduce a sentence upon the revocation of probation is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
C. Gentry Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Executing His Sentence Without Reduction Upon Revoking 
Probation 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citations omitted). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether 
a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those 
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standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any reasonable view of 
the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). 
Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment 
or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 
730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine the entire record encompassing 
events before and after the original judgment" - i.e., "facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 29, 218 
P.3d at 8. Contrary to Gentry's assertions on appeal, the record in this case 
shows no abuse of discretion in the sentence ultimately imposed. 
Gentry has a long history of refusing to abide by the law and the terms of 
community supervision. His criminal record consists of at least 16 misdemeanor 
convictions and three felony convictions, the majority of which are either drug 
and/or alcohol related or stem from crimes of violence. (PSI, pp.4-8.) He has 
served numerous jail terms, has completed a prior period of retained jurisdiction, 
and has been afforded multiple other rehabilitative opportunities, including by 
participating in mental health court and being placed on several prior periods of 
probation. (Id.) Neither prior legal sanctions nor attempts at rehabilitation have 
proved successful in deterring Gentry from committing new crimes. In fact, he 
was awaiting disposition of a probation violation on a 2009 felony injury to jail 
case when he committed the battery on detention staff that led to his conviction 
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in this case. (PSI, pp.3, 7-8; Tr., p.78, L.23 - p.79, L.6.) And, less than one 
month after being placed on probation in this case, Gentry violated the conditions 
of his release by, among other things, associating with a known felon, failing to 
submit to urinalysis and failing to report for supervision. (R., pp.101-04; Tr., p.48, 
L.17-p.50, L.15.) 
Despite Gentry's demonstrated inability to comply with the terms of 
probation, the district court was willing to give Gentry yet another chance for 
community based rehabilitation if Gentry could secure the transfer of his 
probation to another state. (Tr., p.51, L.25 - p.52, L.6.) Gentry and his attorney 
repeatedly advised the court, both at the time of the original sentencing and at 
hearings that followed, that Gentry stood a dim chance of abiding by the law and 
the conditions of probation if he remained in Pocatello. (PSI, pp.13-14; Tr., p.55, 
Ls.9-12, p.65, Ls.13-14, p.67, Ls.2-7, p.75, Ls.15-16, p.81, Ls.8-11.) In light of 
this concession, and considering Gentry's extensive criminal history and prior 
failed attempts and community based rehabilitation, the district court acted well 
within its discretion - upon learning that Gentry had no option but to remain in 
Pocatello - in ordering the originally imposed sentence of five years, with three 
years fixed, executed without reduction. The sentence was reasonable both to 
promote Gentry's rehabilitation and to protect the community from Gentry's 
admitted inability to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. 
Ignoring the number and nature of his probation violations and his own 
concessions regarding his poor chance of succeeding in the community in 
Pocatello, Gentry argues the court should have sua sponte reduced his sentence 
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based on what he characterizes as the "positive lifestyle changes" he made 
between the time the court originally pronounced its sentence and the time it 
revoked Gentry's probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Specifically, Gentry 
argues the court should have reduced his sentence because he was not a 
disciplinary problem during his most recent period of local incarceration. (Id.) 
While Gentry's institutional performance is laudable, it only reinforces that 
incarceration is serving to foster Gentry's rehabilitation; it was not itself a 
sufficient basis to reduce Gentry's already reasonable sentence, particularly 
since Gentry himself admitted he has difficulty maintaining a positive lifestyle in 
the local community. Gentry has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Gentry's probation and executing his sentence without reduction. 
DATED this 31 st day of October 2013. 
LAF/pm 
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